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Randolph v. Green Tree Financial
Corp: Does a Failure to Allocate Arbitration Expenses in a Mandatory
Arbitration Clause Prevent
Consumers from Vindicating Their
Cause of Action
Michael Wax

I. Introduction
It is common knowledge that the courts in our
country are flooded with more cases than they can
handle. America's court dockets are so backlogged, it
may take an individual case seven or more years to reach
a courtroom. Congress has recognized this problem of
overcrowded dockets and has attempted to find solutions
to reduce the load of the courts. One solution has been to
encourage disputing parties to use alternative dispute
resolution forums in order to provide a more time-effective means for parties to resolve their disputes.1
Arbitration is one type of alternative dispute
resolution encouraged by Congress! By agreeing to
arbitration, the parties submit their disputes to arbitrators, neutral parties whose reasoning and final decisions
or awards supplant the judgment of the established
judicial tribunals.3 The decisions made by arbitrators can
be binding and enforceable in courts.4
Congress' stance in favor of arbitration has met
much success, as it has become increasingly popular for
parties to relinquish their right to have a judicial proceeding and submit their claims to arbitration.5 In addition,
Congress has also received the support of the courts
which have recognized a federal policy favoring arbitration.6
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As arbitration has become a more acceptable
means for resolving disputes, it has become more and
more popular for vendors, finance companies, and employers to include mandatory arbitration clauses in their
contracts which preclude the use of the judicial system.7
Such mandatory arbitration clauses have been the subject
of a substantial amount of controversy.' In accordance
with the federal policy favoring arbitration, the Supreme
Court has held that federal statutory claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitration9 and that arbitration
does not weaken the protections afforded by the substantive law to would be claimants. °
Randolph v. Green Tree FinancialCorp., decided by
the Supreme Court in December 2000, presents one such
controversy that has arisen in the growing area of mandatory arbitration." The issue presented in Randolph was
whether a mandatory arbitration clause would be enforceable if it did not allocate the payment of the arbitration expenses between the parties. 2 The case started out
in an Eleventh Circuit District Court that found that the
clause was enforceable. 3 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a mandatory
arbitration clause must allocate expenses in a reasonable
manner so as not to preclude a customer's use of the
forum. 4 In December of 2000, however, the appellate
court's decision was overturned by a 5 to 4 Supreme
Court decision. 5
These courts are not the only courts that cannot
seem to come to a unanimous decision with regards to
this issue. The issue is one over which other circuit courts
have also struggled. 6 This Note will take a close look at
the history of this issue and the arguments presented by
both sides of the issue. Specifically, it will focus on the
majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court's
December 2000 decision in Randolph and analyze which
side presented a more compelling argument. Finally, this
Note will explore the possible effects of the Randolph
decision on consumers and future mandatory arbitration
clauses.
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II. Background
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA") which was re-enacted and codified under
Title IV of the United States Code in 1947.17 The FAA
represents Congress' first attempt to encourage the use of
the arbitration system.ls The FAA governs the adjudication of federal statutory claims in an arbitral forum. With
regard to contracts that contain mandatory arbitration
clauses, the FAA states that "a written provision in any
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such a contract .... shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."19 According to the Act, the federal district
courts are required to compel arbitration for any case in
which there is no issue as to whether the parties have
decided contractually to submit claims to an
arbitrator.20 The federal district courts are also prohibited
by the Act from becoming involved in such a case "until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
agreement.'
The Supreme Court has also taken the stance that
federal statutory claims can be appropriately resolved
through arbitration.22 As a result, the Supreme Court has
generally held parties to their agreements to arbitrate.
The Court has rejected generalized attacks on arbitration
that rest on "suspicion of arbitration as a method of
weakening the protections afforded in the substantive
law to would-be complainants," 23 as well as attacks that
arbitration agreements should be invalidated because of
unequal bargaining power between the contracting
parties.24
The Supreme Court has, however, provided two
loopholes by which a party may avoid enforcement of a
mandatory arbitration clause. The first came in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Corp., a case which
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involved a contract between a car manufacturer and car
dealership and a dispute over the mandatory arbitration
clause contained in the contract.a The Court ruled in
Mitsubishi that a party could avoid enforcement of the
arbitration clause by showing that "Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue. 2 6
A second loophole can be found in the Court's
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.27 In
Gilmer, the Court held that a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 could be subjected to a mandatory arbitration clause. a The Court
stated that "so long as the prospective litigant may effectively vindicate his or her statutory causes of action in the
arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function."2 9 Thus, if a litigant is
unable, for whatever reason, to effectively vindicate his
or her statutory causes of action in an arbitration forum,
the court should refuse to enforce a mandatory arbitration clause. 0

III. Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp.
In Randolph v. Green Tree FinancialCorp.,
Randolph's complaint arose from her purchase of a
mobile home from Better Cents Home Builders, Inc., in
Opeika, Alabama in January 1994. 31 Randolph financed
the mobile home through an Alabama corporation called
Green Tree Financial Corp. ("Green Tree").32 The financing agreement required Randolph to purchase vendor's
single interest insurance, which protects a vendor against
the costs of repossession in the event of borrower default.33 Randolph alleged that the manner in which this
was required of her did not conform with Congress'
Truth In Lending Act ("TILA") as the TILA disclosure
statement failed to mention this requirement. 34 Randolph
also sought to bring action on behalf of a class of individuals who were also alleging that TILA had been
Loyola Consumer Law Review
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violated in their transactions with Green Tree. 35 In response to the filing of the lawsuit, Green Tree sought to
compel Randolph, and each member of her class, to take
their complaints to an arbitral forum pursuant to the
arbitration clause in the financing contract.36
In January of 1996, the district court was the first
to decide on the enforceability of the mandatory arbitration clause. 37 The court stated that in order for Randolph
to prevail, she would have to rebut the federal presumption in favor of arbitration by demonstrating that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue. 38 The court found that
Randolph did not meet this burden and compelled her to
submit to arbitration. 39 The court also rejected arguments
that the clause lacked consideration since Green Tree was
not itself required to arbitrate claims that arose' and that
her failure to read the contract rendered it unenforceable.41
Randolph then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. 42 Despite acknowledging the strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration,43 the court reversed
the district court's decision, declining to enforce Green
Tree's arbitration clause. 44 The court based its decision on
the loophole provided in Gilmer, which allows one to
escape mandatory arbitration if it appears that the litigant will be unable to effectively vindicate his or her
45
statutory causes of action in an arbitral forum.
The court stated that procedural flaws can present
barriers to a litigant's exercise of statutory rights such
that they render an arbitration clause unenforceable. 46 In
order to avoid such barriers, the court held that an arbitration clause must provide the "minimum guarantees"
required to ensure that a plaintiff can vindicate her statutory rights. 7 In the court's opinion, these minimum
guarantees were not present in Randolph since the possibility of bearing the brunt of "hefty" arbitration costs and
"steep filing fees" would likely prevent Randolph from
arbitration. 4
Volume 13, Number 3 2001
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IV. The Prospective vs. Retrospective Schools
of Thought in Analyzing This Issue
In analyzing arbitration clause enforceability
issues, courts commonly begin their analysis by acknowledging Gilmer.49 Federal circuit courts have a common
understanding the federal circuit courts of Gilmer and the
concept that the Federal Arbitration Act will only "serve
its remedial and deterrent function... so long as the
prospective litigant may effectively vindicate his or her
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum." 5° Consequently, courts are generally willing to invalidate an
arbitration clause if it contains provisions that defeat the
remedial purpose of the Act.1
Several circuit courts have also acknowledged that
steep arbitration fees and costs imposed on a plaintiff
might violate the Gilmer concept and prevent a party
from being heard in an arbitration forum.52 In Shankle v.
B-G MaintenanceManagement of Colorado,Inc., the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that an arbitration
agreement's allocation of fees and expenses limited an
employee's use of the arbitral forum and rendered the
agreement unenforceable.53 In Cole v. Burns International
Security Systems, Inc., an employer was required by the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to pay all arbitration expenses where arbitration was required by the employer. 54
While courts generally acknowledge the above
mentioned concepts, a split has developed among the
circuits as to whether a failure to allocate fees in an arbitration agreement is a serious enough threat to render the
clause unenforceable. There are two competing schools of
thought that have developed in the federal circuit courts
with regards to the issue.
The first school of thought was adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Randolph. The
Randolph test for enforceability examines whether or not
the arbitration agreement presents such barriers to arbitration so as to deny the plaintiff the opportunity to
276
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vindicate her statutory right. The issue is evaluated
prospectively in an attempt to determine the likelihood
that these barriers will deny access to arbitration.' There
is no requirement of certainty; 57 one must only show that
they will likely be prevented from having their day in
arbitration." If it appears that the consumer may be
required to pay steep arbitration expenses, preventing
them from having their case arbitrated, the court will
invalidate the clause.59
On the other hand, the First, Second, and Seventh
Circuits have found that the mere possibility that a plaintiff may be required to pay arbitration fees is not by itself
a sufficient reason to invalidate an agreement to
arbitrate." These courts have taken the stance that the
issue can only be decided retrospectively.6 Courts adopting this school of thought will only invalidate a mandatory arbitration clause when the expenses have actually
been imposed on a claimant. 62 A showing of either the
claimant's dire financial situation or the steep arbitration
expenses imposed on the claimant, or both, are required
before the court will invalidate the mandatory arbitration
clause.6 3

It is the belief of these courts that the mere possibility that a claimant will not have her case heard is not
enough to invalidate a clause.64 These courts want to be
certain that the imposition of fees will make the claimant
unable to enforce her rights. Therefore, they maintain
that the availability of judicial review after arbitration is a
sufficient means to insure that a claimant will not be
prevented from arbitrating her claim.65

V. The Supreme Court's Decision
In December of 2000, of the Supreme Court of the
United States took its turn in evaluating whether Green
Tree's mandatory arbitration clause should be held enforceable against Randolph. 66 In a 5 to 4 decision, the
Court found the clause to be enforceable upon Randolph,
Volume 13, Number 3 2001
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denying her the use of the judicial forum. 67 Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court and was
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas and
68
Kennedy.
The Court began its decision by recognizing the
federal policy in favor of arbitration and acknowledging
its Gilmer principle that arbitration will only be enforceable if it does not prevent a "litigant from effectively
vindicating" his or her cause of action.6 9 The Court continued its analysis by asking whether the parties agreed
to submit their claims to arbitration and whether Congress had evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.7" Finding both an agreement and no intention by Congress to
preclude a waiver, the Court went on to deal with the
issue of whether the contract's silence with regards to
arbitration fees rendered the mandatory arbitration
clause void.7 '
The Court started its analysis of this question by
admitting "it may well be that the existence of large
arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as
Randolph from effectively vindicating her statutory
rights in the arbitral forum. 72 While noting this possibility, the Court next stated "that the risk that Randolph will
be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to
justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement." 73 In
adopting the retrospective school of thought previously
discussed, the Court held that a more definitive showing
that expenses will prevent access to the arbitral forum
must be made in order for Randolph to prevail. 74
The Court also stated that the burden to make
such a showing was on Randolph because she was the
party who sought to avoid the arbitration. 75 In discussing
this burden that Randolph was required to meet, the
Court stated that the burden cannot be met by a hypothetical showing of what arbitration could possibly cost
the plaintiff.76 According to the Court, "such unsupported
statements provide no basis on which to ascertain the
278
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actual costs and fees to which she would be subject to in
arbitration."77 Rather, in order to meet the necessary
burden, the Court stated that a plaintiff must show that
in her particular case, the expenses will prevent her from
making it into arbitration.' The Court listed examples of
adequate evidence being "information about how
' or
claimant's fare under Green Tree's arbitration clause"79
a naming of the arbitration organization that Green Tree
uses and the fees that it charges. 0
The majority opinion concluded by attempting to
justify why it placed the burden on the plaintiff to make
this showing.8" The Court discussed two of the arguments
made by parties in the past to avoid mandatory arbitration- that a particular case is unsuitable for arbitration
and that Congress intended to preclude arbitration. 2 In
these types of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the
burden to make the respective showing is always on the
party that seeks to avoid arbitration. 3 The Court felt that
it followed from these decisions, that a party seeking to
avoid arbitration because of expenses, should also bear
the burden to show the likelihood of incurring such
costs' 4

VI. Analysis
A. The Supreme Court's Decisions in Gilmer and
McMahon Should Not Have Been Used by the Majority
to Decide Whether Randolph Bore the Burden of Proof
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
cited the Court's Gilmer and McMahon decisions, two
cases in which the plaintiffs also sought to void mandatory arbitration clauses. 5 In Gilmer and McMahon, the
Court dealt with the adequacy of the arbitral forum for
adjudicating the statutory claims at issue in the cases.'s In
both cases, the Court held that the party resisting arbitration possessed the burden of proving that the claims at
issue were unsuitable for arbitration. 7 Following these
Volume 13, Number 3 2001

Loyola Consumer Law Review

279

cases, the majority in Randolph held that Randolph
should also bear the burden in her case.88 However, as the
dissent pointed out, the Gilmer and McMahon cases were
different types of cases 89 and it did not logically follow
"like the night the day" 90 that Gilmer and McMahon
should serve as precedent to determine that Randolph
bore the burden of proof.
In Gilmer and McMahon, the issue was whether the
arbitral forum was adequate to adjudicate the case or if
the judicial forum would provide for a more appropriate
forum. 91 Therefore, the Court's focus was on the subject
matter of the dispute as well the arbitral forum's ability
to resolve that dispute. In Randolph, the issue was
whether the forum was accessible to the party resisting
arbitration.92 In this type of case, the focus is not on what
happens once the case reaches arbitration, but rather,
whether the plaintiff will be able to reach arbitration.
Not only do these cases address different issues,
they require different showings of proof in order for a
claimant to meet its burden. In Gilmer and McMahon, the
Court held that in order to prevail, the party attempting
to avoid arbitration must show that Congress intended to
preclude arbitration when it drafted the respective statutes under which the plaintiffs' claims arose.93 This
showing required going through the legislation as well
legislative history such as congressional reports that have
been published. As such, this was information that both
parties could retrieve by using traditional research tools
that are equally available to everyone. Therefore, because
this information was readily available, it was not unreasonable to assign the burden to the plaintiffs in Gilmer
and McMahon in lieu of the federal stance favoring arbitration.
In contrast, the information required by the Court
to allow Randolph to prevail was information that was
more accessible to Green Tree than it was to Randolph.
As the dissent points out, "as a repeat player in the arbitration required by its form contract, Green Tree has
280
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superior information about the cost to consumers of
pursuing arbitration."94 The majority mentioned certain
examples of proof that might provide a realistic projection of what Randolph's expenses would be to arbitrate
and therefore enable the Court to find for Randolph. Both
examples referred to by the Court were pieces of information either more readily available to Green Tree than
Randolph or accessible to Green Tree and not accessible
to Randolph at all.
The first example mentioned was a showing of
how previous plaintiffs had faired in arbitration with
Green Tree. This is information that Green Tree would
have possessed in its files and would have most likely
only been available to Randolph had Green Tree made it
available to her. The second example mentioned by the
Court was a naming of the arbitration organization Green
Tree uses and how that system usually allocates its expenses. Once again, this is information that Green Tree
would possess and would be accessible to Randolph only
if Green Tree were to provide her with that information.
B. Where Does This Decision Leave Ms. Randolph and
Other Similarly Situated Consumers?
It is ironic that the Court began its decision by
acknowledging the Gilmer principle that arbitration will
only be enforceable so long as it does not prevent a "liti95
gant from effectively vindicating" their cause of action
because the Court's decision does not embrace this principle. The Court does not attempt to discern the position
it has placed Randolph and other similarly situated
consumers as a result of its decision. If it had, it would
have realized that it has placed such consumers in a
position where vindicating his or her rights will be extremely difficult, if not impossible.
If the majority's position does not prevent the
litigant from effectively vindicating her cause of action, it
certainly makes it less likely that vindication will occur.
Volume 13, Number 3 2001
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Effectively, in the aftermath of Randolph, a potential
litigant in this situation is given the option of either
submitting to an arbitration hearing without knowing
how much that hearing will cost them or demonstrating,
up front, that the costs, if imposed on them, will be
prohibitive. 6
In terms of submitting to arbitration without
knowing how much it will cost, consumers will always
endure the possibility that they will have to pay for all of
the arbitration fees and expenses. The consumer who can
risk the possibility of being assessed high arbitration fees
will still have her day to vindicate her cause of action. In
the end, the arbitrator may have actually assessed an
amount to the consumer that was "prohibitively
expensive" 97 to her ability to arbitrate. Under the system
that Randolph establishes, this consumer can then enter
the judicial system and endure years of possible litigation
to recover all or part of the arbitration fees and expenses. 9
While the above consumer's plight is extremely
burdensome, the Randolph decision will be even more
detrimental to the consumer that cannot endure this risk.
In the case of a consumer who is not financially endowed, it may be extremely risky for them to submit to
arbitration with the possibility that they will be saddled
with fees that they cannot afford. In some cases, arbitration has been shown to be extremely expensive. Often
arbitrators can charge $700 to $800 per hour 99 and total
fees for a plaintiff have been known to reach many thousands of dollars. 100 There can be no doubt that such fees
may intimidate such a consumer into foregoing her
option to arbitrate. This consumer will be harmed the
most by the Randolph decision as she will have to live
with any harm that the defendant may have caused her.
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C. The Option Given by the Supreme Court to Prove
Up Front that Arbitration Fees Will be Prohibitively
Expensive Is Not an Easy Burden to Meet as Shown in
Randolph
The second option provided to consumers by the
Randolph decision is to demonstrate up front, that the
costs, if imposed on them, will be prohibitive to their
attempt to vindicate their cause of action. 1 1 As mentioned
previously, the majority decision listed two types of proof
that could have been sufficiently demonstrative of the
prohibition - a showing of the fees charged by the arbitration organization that Green Tree uses to hear its cases or
a showing of how other plaintiffs had faired under Green
Tree's arbitration clause.
It is possible that a company's arbitrator could be
a matter of public knowledge. However, in Randolph,
Green Tree had not designated a particular arbitration
association or arbitrator that it used to resolve its disputes or at least they had not informed Randolph of
such.0 2 As a result, Randolph was prevented from making an argument to show that the fees normally charged
by Green Tree's arbitrator, if imposed on her, would be
prohibitively expensive.
Without this option, Randolph chose to use the
hypothetical situation of arbitrating with a commonly
used arbitration association, the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA"). 10 3 She showed the fees and ex-

penses normally charged by AAA for arbitration and
explained that she would not be able to pay the expenses."° The Court rejected this showing by Randolph
because there was no factual showing that the American
Arbitration Association would be conducting the arbitration. 05
The second type of proof mentioned by the Court
was a showing of how previous plaintiffs had faired
under Green Tree's arbitration clause. Unlike the previous method of proof mentioned, this information would
Volume 13, Number 3 2001
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be almost definitely be unavailable to the public. Therefore, a plaintiff would not be able to get this information
unless it was given to them. A company like Green Tree
most likely would not just hand this information over
unless they were compelled to in a situation such as
discovery. Unfortunately for Randolph, or a similarly
situated plaintiff, there is no discovery in this situation.
As a result, Randolph was left with another type of proof
that was impossible for her to produce.
What could Randolph have done to make the
proper showing of proof? She attempted to demonstrate
to the Court how the fees of a prominent arbitration
organization would be prohibitively expensive to her. In
the eyes of the Court this was insufficient. She simply did
not have access to the information that the majority was
looking for. While future plaintiffs may have access to the
items of proof that the Court requested, Randolph demonstrates that this information may not always be easily
available to a consumer. As a result, Randolph also demonstrates that in a situation where a contract requires
mandatory arbitration without allocating arbitration
expenses, it is going to be difficult for a plaintiff to show
that the costs will be prohibitively expensive until those
costs are actually imposed on the plaintiff.

VII. Conclusion
In the aftermath of Randolph, it is clear that the
Supreme Court is determined to stand behind the federal
policy in favor of arbitration. Despite the Court's acknowledgment that it is prepared to invalidate any
mandatory arbitration clause that will prevent a claimant
from vindicating his or her cause of action, it did not do
so in Randolph. As the dissent points out, the Court may
have been so ready to support the federal policy that it
"reached out prematurely to resolve the matter in the
lender's favor." In doing so, it may not have truly recog-
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nized the effect its decision will have on Randolph and
other plaintiffs in her position.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, a
Randolph-like consumer will be left in a state of uncertainty. Heading into arbitration, a Randolph-like consumer will not only be uncertain as to the result the
arbitration will render, but there will also be an uncertainty as to how much the arbitration will cost them.
Those consumers who can risk the possibility of
being assessed high arbitration fees will still have their
day to vindicate their cause of action. However, for other
consumers, who will not be able to risk the possibility of
being assessed high arbitration fees, the uncertainty will
result in their claim never making it into the arbitral
forum. Thus, such consumers will never have the opportunity to vindicate their cause of action.
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